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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
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MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY; ROBERT REICH, 
Individually, and in his capacity as Secretary of Labor 
and Industry of the United States of America; 
DAVID LOTZ, Individually, and in his capacity as D irector 
of the Office of Workers' Compensation 
 
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF WATERFRONT EMPLOYERS 
AND THE SHIPBUILDERS COUNCIL OF AMERICA, 
       Intervener-Plaintiff in D.C. 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 93-cv-03903) 
District Judge: Honorable Joseph H. Rodriguez 
 
Argued: June 14, 2000 
 
Before: BECKER, Chief Judge, ALDISERT, Circuit Judge 
and O'KELLEY, District Judge.* 
 





* Honorable William C. O'Kelley, United States District Judge for the 
Northern District of Georgia, sitting by designation. 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge. 
 
The issue on appeal is whether the Longshoreman and 
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act ("LHWCA"), 33 U.S.C. 
SS 901-950 (2000), is unconstitutional on its face because 
it allows employers and their insurance carriers to 
terminate payment of workers' compensation benefits 
without notice. Specifically, we must decide whether 
Appellant Carl Kreschollek's employer, Southern 
Stevedoring Co., and its insurance carrier, Lumbermen's 
Mutual Casualty Co., violated his right to due process when 
it terminated his workers' compensation payments without 
notice. 
 
The Court decided a similar issue relating to state 
worker's compensation benefits in American Mfr. Mut. Ins. 
Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40 (1999). The Court teaches in 
Sullivan, that (1) "an insurer's decision to withhold payment 
and seek utilization review of the reasonableness and 
necessity of particular medical treatment is not fairly 
attributable to the State," id. at 58, and (2) employees do 
not have a property interest in workers compensation 
benefits when they have not demonstrated that they are 
entitled to them and a state statute requires that they prove 
"that an employer is liable for a work-related injury, and 
. . . that the particular medical treatment at issue is 
reasonable and necessary." Id. at 61. We must therefore 
determine whether the teachings of Sullivan apply to 
LHWCA procedures and the case at bar. We hold that they 
do and will affirm the judgment of the district court 
dismissing Kreschollek's claim. 
 
The district court had federal question jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1331. This court has appellate 
jurisdiction over the final decision of the district court 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. Kreschollekfiled a timely 
notice of appeal under Rule 4(a), Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
 
The district court treated a motion brought under Rule 
12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as a one for 
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summary judgment because the court looked outside the 
pleadings in making its decision. We review a grant of 
summary judgment by applying the same criteria used by 
the district court in the first instance. Olson v. General Elec. 
Astrospace, 101 F.3d 947, 951 (3d Cir. 1996). We will 
affirm the judgment if "there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact [and] the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c), Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure; see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 
U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 
 
Kreschollek contends on appeal that the LHWCA is 
unconstitutional on its face because it allows private 
companies to halt workers' compensation benefits at will, 
when there has been no formal compensation award. The 
statute provides: 
 
       (c) Notification of commencement or suspension of 
       payment 
 
        Upon making the first payment, and upon 
       suspension of payment for any cause, the employer 
       shall immediately notify the deputy commissioner, in 
       accordance with a form prescribed by the Secretary, 
       that payment of compensation has begun or has been 
       suspended, as the case may be. 
 
       (d) Right to compensation controverted 
 
        If the employer controverts the right to compensation 
       he shall file with the deputy commissioner on or before 
       the fourteenth day after he has knowledge of the 
       alleged injury or death, a notice, in accordance with a 
       form prescribed by the Secretary, stating that the right 
       to compensation is controverted, the name of the 
       claimant, the name of the employer, the date of the 
       alleged injury or death, and the grounds upon which 
       the right to compensation is controverted. 
 
33 U.S.C. S 914(c), (d). 
 
The Court has made clear, however, that a facial attack 
on a statute must also satisfy the same requirements as an 
attack on a private individual's actions: (1) the 
"constitutional deprivation [must be] caused by the exercise 
of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule 
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of conduct imposed by the State or by a person for whom 
the state is responsible, and [2] the party charged with the 
deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be 
a state actor." Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 50 (internal quotations 




Appellant Carl Kreschollek suffered a work-related injury 
on March 20, 1990 while employed by Appellee Southern 
Stevedoring Company. As a result of his injury he was 
unable to work as a stevedore. His employer, Southern 
Stevedoring, and its insurer, Appellee Lumbermen's Mutual 
Casualty Company, voluntarily initiated disability 
payments. Southern and Lumbermen's filed a Form LS-206 
(payment of compensation with award) informing the 
district director of the Office of Workers Compensation 
Programs ("OWCP") that they voluntarily began making 
payments to Kreschollek. See 33 U.S.C. S 914(a). On 
October 29, 1992, Appellees stopped making the 
compensation payments and, pursuant to 33 U.S.C. 
S 914(c), (d), filed notice of their decision with the district 
director. The director then sent Kreschollek a notice on 
November 2, 1992 that Appellees terminated his benefits 
because he was fit to return to work. 
 
Kreschollek contested the termination of compensation 
payments and, on November 24, 1992, he requested that 
the district director hold an informal conference with the 
parties pursuant to 20 C.F.R. S 702.261 ("Where the 
claimant contests an action by the employer . . . 
terminating benefits . . . he should immediately notify the 
office of the district director . . . and set forth the facts 
pertinent to his complaint."). The director conducted the 
conference on December 16, 1992, but the parties were 
unable to resolve their differences. On January 7, 1993, 
Kreschollek filed a pre-hearing statement and a request for 
the director to transfer the case for a formal hearing before 
a Department of Labor Administrative Law Judge. The ALJ 
held a hearing in December 1993, in which he agreed with 
the employer and determined that the benefits termination 
was proper. Kreschollek unsuccessfully petitioned the 
Benefits Review Board for review of the ALJ's decision. We 
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denied the petition for review. See Kreschollek v. Southern 
Stevedoring Co., 129 F.3d 1255 (3d Cir. 1997) (table cite). 
 
On December 2, 1993, while his appeal was underway, 
Kreschollek filed a complaint in the district court alleging 
that Appellees violated his rights to due process and equal 
protection when they suspended payment of compensation 
benefits to him without first affording him notice or a 
hearing. He also facially attacked the LHWCA, contending 
that the provisions of the Act that permit private employers 
and their insurers to suspend the voluntary payment of 
compensation benefits violated his Fifth Amendment due 
process rights. The district court granted the director's 
motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction to 
consider a constitutional challenge to LHWCA procedures, 
but on appeal we reversed the dismissal and held that the 
district court possessed the necessary jurisdiction. See 
Kreschollek v. Southern Stevedoring Co., 78 F.3d 868 (3d 
Cir. 1996). 
 
The director again renewed his motion to dismiss, but in 
an opinion filed September 30, 1997, relying on Barksalary 
v. Smith, 579 F. Supp. 218 (E.D. Pa. 1984), the district 
court denied the motion. The court ruled that the private 
Appellees were "state actors" as a result of their purported 
"joint participation" with federal officials in the suspension 
of benefits and that Kreschollek had a protected property 
interest in the continuation of benefits. 
 
All of these proceedings took place before March 1999, 
when the Court handed down its decision in Sullivan, 
which held there is no state action when an employer 
terminates voluntary payment of benefits, 526 U.S. at 51, 
and that an employee has no property interests in 
unadjudicated benefits under a Pennsylvania workers' 
compensation statute. 526 U.S. at 59-61. The district court 
subsequently withdrew its decision and filed a new 
judgment on June 26, 1999 in which it held that 
withdrawal of benefits by the employer was not state action 
and that Kreschollek did not have a property interest in the 
continued receipt of benefits. Dist. Ct. Op. at 6. Kreschollek 
now appeals. 
 




We believe that the Court's teachings in Sullivan control 
this case. In that case the plaintiffs filed suit under 42 
U.S.C. S 1983 against various Pennsylvania officials, a self- 
insured public school district and a number of private 
workers' compensation insurers, alleging that the 
withholding of benefits without notice and an opportunity 
to be heard deprived them of property in violation of due 
process. Pennsylvania law permits insurers to delay paying 
a medical bill under the workers' compensation act until a 
review has been made of the claim to ensure that it is 
medically necessary. The insurer is required tofile a form 
with the state Workers' Compensation Bureau requesting a 
utilization review of the procedure. The Bureau makes no 
attempt to address the legitimacy of the request, but rather 
simply ensures the form was filled out correctly before 
forwarding the request to a randomly selected utilization 
review organization. 
 
The Court held that the respondent satisfied thefirst 
requirement of showing a violation of due process because 
"it may fairly be said that private insurers act with the 
knowledge of and pursuant to the state statute . . .." 
Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 50 (internal quotations omitted). The 
Court explained, however, that the respondents failed to 
establish the second requirement inasmuch as "the party 
charged with the deprivation [was not] a person who may 
fairly be said to be a state actor." Id. (internal quotations 
and citations omitted). Because the decision to refuse 
payment was made by the insurer alone without state 
approval or standards, there was no state action. The Court 
identified "the specific conduct of which the plaintiff 
complains [as] a private insurer's decision to withhold 
payment for disputed medical treatment." Id.  at 51 (internal 
citations and quotations omitted). The Court determined 
that "[t]he decision to withhold payment . . . is made by 
concededly private parties, and turns on judgments made 
by private parties without standards established by the 
State." Id. at 52 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
The Court described the process as one where the state 
purposefully did not become involved in the dispute: 
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       The State's decision to allow insurers to withhold 
       payments pending review can just as easily be seen as 
       state inaction, or more accurately, a legislative decision 
       not to intervene in a dispute between an insurer and 
       an employee over whether a particular treatment is 
       reasonable and necessary. 
 




The benefit suspension provision of the LHWCA is an 
analogue to the Pennsylvania worker's compensation 
statute. It provides that the insurer may suspend the 
payment of benefits "for any cause" whatsoever. 33 U.S.C. 
S 914(c). Moreover, the notice of benefits termination 
afforded to a district director is not a "request" for anything; 
it is purely an administrative function and is not even 
reviewed for procedural correctness.1 The specific conduct 
Appellant complains of is "a private insurer's decision to 
withhold payment for disputed medical treatment." Id. at 
51. The Act provides: 
 
       If the employer controverts the right to compensation 
       he shall file with the deputy commissioner on or before 
       the fourteenth day after he has knowledge of the 
       alleged injury or death, a notice, in accordance with a 
       form prescribed by the Secretary, stating that the right 
       to compensation is controverted, the name of the 
       claimant, the name of the employer, the date of the 
       alleged injury or death, and the grounds upon which 
       the right to compensation is controverted. 
 
33 U.S.C. S 914(d). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Department of Labor substituted the designation "district director" 
for the statutory term "deputy commissioner" in 1990. 
 
       Wherever the statute refers to Deputy Commissioner, these 
       regulations have substituted the term District Director. The 
       substitution is purely an administrative one, and in no way effects 
       the authority of or the powers granted and responsibilities imposed 
       by the statute on that position. 
 
20 C.F.R. 702.105. We use the designation "district director." 
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In the Pennsylvania plan a form is filed with the Worker's 
Compensation Bureau of the Department of Labor and 
Industry. Upon filing the form, an insurer may withhold 
payment to health care providers for the particular services 
being challenged. The Bureau then notifies the parties that 
utilization review has been requested and forwards the 
request to a "utilization review organization" (URO). If the 
URO finds in favor of the insurer, the employee then may 
appeal to a worker's compensation judge for a de novo 
review. See Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 46-47. 
 
Under provisions of the LHWCA, upon receipt of notice 
than an employer has disputed its liability under the Act or 
that it has suspended payment, the district director must 
attempt to resolve the parties' disagreement.2 The district 
director typically holds an informal conference and 
embodies any agreement reached through the conference in 
an enforceable written memorandum. 20 C.F.R. 
S 702.315(a). If the parties do not reach agreement at the 
informal conference or if no conference is held, then the 
district director will transfer the case to the Office of the 
Chief Administrative Law Judge for a formal evidentiary 
hearing. 33 U.S.C. S 919(c)-(d); 20 C.F.R.S 702.301, .316. 
After conducting a hearing, the ALJ makes findings of fact 
and conclusions of law and issues an enforceable 
compensation order, which is filed with the district director. 
33 U.S.C. S 919(c); 20 C.F.R. S 702.348-.349. The 
government becomes active only after "concededly private 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The Act provides: 
 
        The deputy commissioner (1) may upon his own initiative at any 
       time in a case in which payments are being made without an award, 
       and (2) shall in any case where right to compensation is 
       controverted, or where payments of compensation have been 
       stopped or suspended, upon receipt of notice from any person 
       entitled to compensation, or from the employer, that the right to 
       compensation is controverted, or that payments of compensation 
       have been stopped or suspended, make such investigations, cause 
       such medical examinations to be made, or hold such hearings, and 
       take such further action as he considers will properly protect the 
       rights of all parties. 
 
33 U.S.C. S 914(h). 
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parties" choose to terminate payment of workers 
compensation benefits. See Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 52. 
 
Thus, the similarities are clear and apparent when we 
examine the essential Pennsylvania and LHWCA procedures 
prior to submission to a state worker's compensation judge 




Additionally, provisions governing suspension of benefits 
payments under the LHWCA and those under the 
Pennsylvania statute are analogous. The Director OWCP 
does not set standards for halting disability payments nor 
approves their termination. The statute provides: 
"Compensation under this chapter shall be paid 
periodically, promptly, and directly to the person entitled 
thereto, without an award, except where liability to pay 
compensation is controverted by the employer." 33 U.S.C. 
S 914(a). The director merely receives notice and attempts 
to mediate disputes. There is no state action resulting from 
"a private party's mere use of the State's dispute resolution 
machinery, without the overt, significant assistance of state 
officials." Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 54. 
 
We therefore reject Appellant's contention that because 
there is pervasive regulation of workers' compensation by 
the LHWCA there is necessarily state action. "The mere fact 
that a business is subject to state regulation does not by 
itself convert its action into that of the State for purposes 
of the Fourteenth Amendment." Jackson v. Metropolitan 
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974). As in Sullivan, the 
actions taken by Appellant's employers cannot be fairly 
attributed to the federal government because there is no 
federal government action involved in an insurer's 
unilateral decision to terminate benefits. 526 U.S. at 51. 
The government, therefore, did not deny Appellant's rights 
secured by the due process clause. 
 
* * * * * 
 
In the view we take it is not necessary to reach other 
issues presented by the parties. The judgment of the 
district court will be affirmed. 
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